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Abstract 
This study investigates the redistributive effect of the social security reform in urban China 
using the nationally representative urban household surveys in 1995 and 2002. The main 
findings are as follows. First, public pension is the main income for the elderly in urban China. 
Majority of people aged 60 and over (72% in 1995, 82% in 2002) have pension. Second, the 
social security system in urban China improved the income of low-income and older age 
groups and reduced the relative poverty rate. However, the redistributive effect did not offset 
the expanding income inequality, which resulted in the Gini coefficient of redistributed 
income in 2002 being higher than that in 1995. Third, during 1995 and 2002, both low income 
group and high income group get positive net benefit from social security system, but the net 
benefit is increasing with income. There is an adverse income transfer in social security 
system no matter measured on annual income or lifetime income. Fourth, assuming that the 
reformed policy were applied to public sector employees, the long-term redistributive effect 
of the pension system for the working population, as calculated using their lifetime income, 
would be larger. 
JEL classification: E21, H55, P43 
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1.  Introduction  
After 30 years economic growth since 1978, China has made significant progress in 
raising the living standards of urban and rural residents and decreasing the population of 
people living below the poverty line. The poverty rate declined from 53% in 1981 to 8% in 
2001 (Ravallion and Chen, 2007)
1. On the other hand a dramatic widening of the income gap 
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had accompanied. According to the World Bank (2003), the Gini coefficient in China rose 
from 0.3 in the 1980s to 0.42 in 1993, which was the most rapid in developing countries
2. 
Moreover, several studies estimate the long-term income inequality in China and find an 
upward trend (e.g. Ravallion and Chen, 2007; Meng et al, 2010). Li and Luo (2011) use the 
latest household survey data to correct the potential biases caused by problems such as the 
difference living cost between urban and rural area, under-representative of high income 
households in the sample and get a Gini coefficient as high as 0.485. As pointed by Chen et al 
(2006), certain sub-groups have been adversely affected or have been unable to participate in 
the new economic opportunities due to their lack of skills, long-term illness or disability. 
Some of the “left behind” households started poor and some became poor, even though 
aggregate poverty rates have tended to fall over time. As a redistributive policy, the effect of 
social security system in current China becomes an important topic concerned by scholars and 
policymakers.  
Social security system generally includes social insurance system, social assistance 
system and social welfare system. Social insurance requires the insured persons to pay certain 
insurance premiums or taxes in order to obtain corresponding rights, which is generally not 
for the purpose of income redistribution. For some social insurance plans, however, benefits 
actually received have little to do with contribution and the benefits may not depend 
                                                                                                                                                            
(H. Sato). This paper is a substantially revised version of our previous paper, “Social security and 
income redistribution in urban China 1995-2002: An empirical analysis based on annual and 
lifetime income,” Fukino Project Discussion Paper, No.004, Hitotsubashi University, 2008. 
Financial supports for this paper by JSPS Grant for Scientific Research No.18203018 and No. 
21330065, Shanghai Pujiang Program , Shanghai Leading Academic Discipline Project (No.B101),   
Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences (G-COE Hi-Stat) are 
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1  For studies on urban and rural poverty in China, see Chen and Ravallion (2004, 2007, 2008)，
Ravallion and Chen (2007), Chen et al (2006), Xia et al(2007), and Luo (2010). 
2  The estimation of income inequality depends on the definition of income. Ravallion and Chen（2007) 
make adjustment for the cost-of-living difference to get a lower Gini coefficient. Before the 
adjustment, it is 0.42 and 0.447 respectively in 1993 and 2001. After adjustment, it is 0.367 and 
0.395 respectively. Li and Luo (2007) include all implicit income of all kinds of social security 
programs and make adjustment for the cost-of-living difference between urban and rural area and 




completely on the amount paid. Thus social insurance plans also contribute to income 
redistribution to a certain extent. Funded by public finance, social assistance and social 
welfare, on the other hand, are direct income redistribution plans. If social security system in 
one country mainly targets at providing social insurance, it has less income distribution 
effects; if social assistance and social welfare, funded by public finance, constitute the major 
part of social security system, the system has relatively strong income distribution effects. In 
addition, the scopes of population covered by social security and the extent of protection 
provided by social security also have direct impacts on its income distribution effects. 
Therefore, the role which the social security system plays in income distribution depends on 
the composition and specific designs of the system. Its effect on income distribution of social 
security is an empirical issue. 
Generally speaking, there are two perspectives to test the redistributive role of social 
security. One is to investigate the effect of certain program in the system. The other is to 
estimate the overall effects of income transfers made by all kinds of programs in the system. 
Annual household or individual data is always used. However, annual data might not reflect 
the real economic situation of the household or the individual (Rosen, 2008). Especially when 
evaluating the redistributive effect of public pension plan, life cycle data is needed to compare 
the total contribution and benefit. During working age period, one contributes to pension 
system and hence the net benefit is negative in each year in this period of life cycle. By 
contrast, one gets positive net benefit after retirement if based on annual income. Therefore, 
we have to predict and estimate the contribution and benefit and obtain the net benefit in life 
cycle. Nelissen （1998） compares the differences using annual income and life cycle income in 
detail. There are several literature to evaluate the redistributive effect of public pension using 
life cycle income for various countries, for instance, Nelissen (2000) for Italy, Coronado et 
al.(2000，2002) and Liebman (2002) for US, Oshio (2002,2005) for Japan.   
For developing countries, Barrientos(2007) concludes that emergent tax-financed social 
security holds the promise to make an impact on global poverty and vulnerability. Kaseke 
(2010) argues that the role of social security in South Africa is to prevent and reduce poverty 
and to promote reintegration. For Chinese system, He (2004) investigated regional and 




medical expenses between urban and rural residents and among China’s eastern, middle, and 
western regions. Ren et al. (2004) conducted a macro study on the intergenerational 
imbalance of the pension system using generational accounting. He (2008) utilized one year’s 
micro data to examine differences in the income transfer effects of public pension plans. 
However, these studies addressed only one separate program the social security system and 
were based on data of one year. They did not examine the overall redistributive effect of 
social security system. 
He and Sato (2008) preliminarily estimate the redistributive effect of social security. But 
there are biases in estimation of income and the more discussion is needed to justify the 
redistributive function of Chinese social security system. This paper will redefine income by 
taking tax and private and public transfer into consideration. The database used is drawn from 
the micro data obtained from the 1995 and 2002 urban household surveys (China Households 
Income Project, or CHIP) by the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
First we use annual data to estimate the transfers by a variety programs including public 
pension, minimum living allowance and investigate the redistributive effect on various 
income groups and age groups. Secondly, we are projecting life cycle income to estimate the 
income redistributive effect of public pension program and we will compare its effect on 
improving income inequality under the different scheme.   
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional context and the data 
used; moreover, we capitalize on the official macro data and micro survey data to consider the 
role of social security system on income distribution in urban China. After introducing 
relevant concepts and empirical methodologies, Section 3 presents the social security’s 
redistributive effect based on individual income in a certain year. Section 4 estimates 
redistributive effects of public pension system with life cycle income and compares the 
different degree of income redistributive effects of various pension plans . Section 5 






2.  Institutional Background and Data 
2.1 Institutional Context 
In 1951, China issued the Insurance Provisions of Republic of China, which included pension, 
medical, and work related accident insurance provisions. This document became the 
embryonic form of the social security system during China’s planned economy era. Prior to 
the economic reforms, Social security for urban employees in public sector
3 and enterprises 
was provided through work units (danwei). The benefits, including pension, medical care, 
housing, and other income subsides, were financed by enterprises or fiscal budget, the 
employees had no necessary to pay for their benefits.   
With transition to a market economy, the original social security system will no longer 
meet the demands of rapid economic development. China started to reform its original social 
security policies after the 1980s; in the late 1990s, the urban employees’ pension system, 
medical insurance, and other social security policies, among others, were adjusted 
substantially. Up to now, urban social security system has been established, consisting of 
social insurance (public pension, medical care, unemployment insurance) and minimum living 
allowance.  
The most important pension reform were introduced in 1995 and revised in 1997, the 
State Council issued a new document, No 26, in July 1997 and established a new pension 
system for urban employees in enterprises, to be called the Basic Pension Insurance
4.The 
Basic Pension Insurance is available for all employees of all urban enterprises, including 
state-owned enterprises, collective enterprises, foreign-owned enterprises etc.
5 The new 
                                                  
3  Public sector here refers to institutions and state organs that are mainly financed by fiscal spending, 
such as government sector, education sector, health sector etc. 
4  The note on the pension system here is mainly based on Feng, He and Sato (2008). Drouin and 
Thompson (2006) had more detailed explanation on the social security system in China.   
5  Some public institutions began to take part in the insurance system since 1999, but the percentage 
was very small. For insured staffs in public institutions, the percentage was 6.7% in 1999 and 9.8% 




system has three pillars: a pooling account to redistribute to all beneficiaries, compulsory 
individual accounts, and voluntary supplementary pensions provided via commercial 
insurance. The first pillar imposes a payroll tax of 17% (paid by employers) to ensure that 
employees who have worked more than 15 years have a replacement ratio of 20%. The 
second pillar (paid jointly by employers and employees) establishes an individual account for 
each employee. The contribution rate for this is 11% of an individual’s wage, of which the 
employer contributes 3-8%. After retirement, the employee gets a monthly benefit from this 
account amounting to the accumulated value divided by 120. But a change was made in 
December 2005 to adjust the percentage that goes to the individual account and the ways to 
calculate and receive pension payments. There were two changes in 2005’s reform, one is the 
contribution rate of individual account declined from 11% to 8%. The other adjustment is to 
change the benefit obtained from first pillar (basic pension) and the second pillar (individual 
account pension). Benefit from the first pillar depends on the amount and years of 
contribution instead using a uniform replacement rate for average income (20% in 1997’s 
version). The benefit from individual account has been changed to be more actuarial (See 
appendix table1 for details). On the other hand, employees in public sectors experience no 
reform and the benefit is a percentage (75-100%) of the wage just before retirement. It is 
worth noting that, in Chinese pension system, the beneficiary is the contributor himself. There 
is no consideration for disabled workers and their families, for young children of a deceased 
worker and for elderly spouses and surviving spouses, which is different from the case in 
some other countries, such as Japan and the US.   
    In December 1998, the State Council selected a new model for urban workers’ health 
insurance, to be called the Basic Medical Insurance System (BMI)
6. The BMI program 
replaced the old health insurance system for urban workers and dependents and the 
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and thereafter as the Basic Medical Care Insurance. Following Drouin and Thompson（2006）, this 




Government Health Insurance System for civil servants and public worker. The 
implementation of the BMI has begun in almost all areas of the country, but is not yet 
complete in that many of the employers that are supposed to be covered by the new system 
are still operating under one of the old systems. Moreover, medical insurance covers 
government employees whereas pensions do not (ILO，2006). The BMI is designed to rely on 
a combination of individual accounts to finance out-patient care and social pooling to finance 
in-patient care. The contribution rate of BMI for employees is 2%. 
The reform of unemployment insurance started in 1998. The contribution rate was 1% of 
an employee’s wage in order to be insured. Employees were not required to pay contributions 
until the unemployment reforms in 1998. In addition, the minimum living allowance 
sponsored by the Ministry of Finance was implemented in 1999. 
We use official macro data to show the coverage of social security system after reform 
(Figure 1). There has been a rapid extension of the coverage, among which BMI rose most 
rapid, from 7% in 1998 to 46% in 2007. Pension insurance coverage rose from 38% in 1995 
to 51% in 2007. Unemployment insurance coverage fluttered around 40%. Although the 
number of urban employees covered by the social insurance had increased in the past decades, 
half of them were not included until 2007. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
In general, the extension of the social security coverage will strengthen the income 
redistributive effect of social security, narrowing income inequality. As mentioned above, 
however, individual contributions to the social security programs were low before the social 
security reforms in the late 1990s, because people could receive various subsidies from their 
work units and retirees could draw benefits equaling a percentage of preretirement wages. It 
seems that during that period the net benefit of social security was always positive for high- 




social security after the reforms for pension, medical insurance and other kinds of insurance. 
Also, some workers did not receive their entitled benefits because of various flaws in the 
system. For example, the original living allowance was replaced by a severance payment for 
laid-off workers. However, Xia et al. (2007) found that only 18% of the laid-off workers’ 
families received this subsidy in 2002. The research also indicated that only 11% of laid-off 
workers’ families received unemployment benefits and only 8% of the laid-off workers’ 
families enjoyed the minimum living standard guarantee. Moreover, Cai, Giles, and Meng 
(2006) found that pension arrearages had emerged in some areas. Therefore, compared with 
the pre-reform system, the relationship between an individual’s social security benefit and his 
contribution was uncertain after the reform. An empirical test is required to determine how the 
social security improved income distribution in urban China by income transfer. We use the 
CHIP data to estimate the social security system’s redistributive effect.   
 
2.2 Data 
The data used in this paper are from the China Households Income Project (CHIP) survey, 
which was conducted in 1996 and 2003 by the Institute of Economics at the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences. The samples of CHIP data were drawn from the large sample 
used by the NBS in its annual household survey
7. The NBS’s sampling method is that the 
respondent households are selected using a two-stage stratified systematic random sampling 
scheme. In the first stage cities and county towns are selected; in the second stage households 
within the selected cities and county towns are chosen. The procedure to select cities and 
county towns is designed as follows. First, all cities and county towns are classified into five 
categories on the basis of their population size. At the second stage, the households are 
selected in each sample city by a multi-phase sampling scheme. The above sampling method 
yields about 35,000 households selected for the NBS annual household survey in 1995 and 
                                                  




45,000 in 2002. These samples represent total urban populations of approximately 350 and 
450 million in the two years, respectively. 
The 1995 and 2002 the CHIP data cover 6,931 families (21,696 individuals) from 11 
provinces and 6,835 families (20,632 individuals) from 12 provinces, respectively. Survey 
questions included individual characteristics, individual incomes, and family assets. 
Information about each respondent’s age, sources of income, employment status, and 
ownership and industry of his/her employer are included. One of the advantages of CHIP data 
is that it has more items of income, such as subsidy for the laid-off, minimum living 
allowance, subsidy from enterprises, the in-kind transfers. The CHIP data were widely applied 
in research on income distribution, and many relevant studies have been published. Recent 
works include Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular (2008), Khan and Riskin (2005), Sicular et al. 
(2007), and Yin et al. (2006). These studies provided insights into changes in China’s income 
distribution structure, urban–rural and regional income disparities, and mobility. For example, 
in their re-estimation of income disparity between urban and rural China, Li, and Luo (2007) 
included all types of invisible income (e.g., social security transfers) in urban residents’ total 
income. Xia et al. (2007) analyzed the trend and pattern of Chinese urban poverty. We are 
going to quantitatively measure the redistributive effect of the social security reform in urban 
China, especially the degree of income inequality under pension reform, using these data sets. 
Table 1 compares income-related statistics of surveys conducted in 1995 and 2002 with data 
from the China Statistical Yearbook with. Table 1 shows that, based on the CHIP data, the 
results of the average wage, the household disposable income per capita, and the pension 
replacement rate were all very close to the ones based on the national  statistics.   
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
Figure 2 describes some basic information about public pension and medical insurance 




aged 60 and over could receive pension. If we focus on the retirees aged 60 and over, in 1995 
95.95% of retirees aged 60 and over received pension payments, and in 2002 98.07% received. 
Pension-R3 indicates that in 2002, 2.14% of retirees did not receive their pensions on due. 
This issue did not appear in the 1995 questionnaire because pensions were rarely in arrears in 
1995. On the other hand, the percentage of people covered by public health insurance 
declined from 61.5% in 1995 to 47.16% in 2002. The decline of the percentage can be further 
separated according to employment status: for active employees the change is from 76.2% in 
1995 to 63.09% in 2002, and for retirees, from 81.76% in 1995 to 71.88% in 2002. The 
numerator and denominator of Health-R1 and Health-R2 included all enterprise and public 
sector employees. Enterprise employees probably received public medical and health services 
in 1995 and did not participate in the new medical insurance system, leading to a decline in 
these two ratios. In addition, the CHIP data indicate that the percentage of unemployed or 
laid-off workers aged 16–59 rose from 2.68% in 1995 to 6.18% in 2002, but only 28.37% 
received unemployment insurance benefits or minimum living allowance. The main sources 
of income for the elderly are pension income, salary and private transfer. The average ratio of 
these three items to total income for the retirees aged 60 and over was 85.39%、 6.05%、 3.83% 
respectively in 1995 and 92.83%、3.18%、1.75% respectively in 2002. Clearly, pension was 
the major and increasing source of income for retirees in urban China and played an essential 
role in old-age income security. 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
 
 
3.  Redistributive effects of social security on different income groups 
We employ the CHIP data to divide individuals into different income groups to estimate 
the income redistribution effects of China’s social security system. First of all, it is necessary 




3.1 Relevant Concepts and Definitions   
The main idea of estimating the redistributive effect is to compare the inequalities of initial 
income and redistributed income. Initial income is an individual’s total earnings prior to 
redistribution, which is derived from either labor or returns on assets, and includes income 
from wages, interest, commercial insurance, income-in-kind, etc., whereas redistributed 
income, in addition to including initial income and net of taxes, also includes the individual’s 
social security benefit. The social security benefit includes not only cash benefits such as 
pension payments but also noncash benefits such as medical treatment, education, and 
services. In China, subsidized public housing is considered an in-kind payment. The taxes 
mentioned include income tax, asset taxes, and social security payments (e.g., pension 
contributions and medical insurance payments). By comparing initial and redistributed 
incomes, we can observe the effects of redistribution policies.   
Two indicators can be used to measure the redistributive effect. One is MT index, which was 
generated by Musgrave and Thin (1948). 
8 The expression of MT index is: 
           M T   =   G   -   G *  
Where G is the Gini coefficient of initial income and G* is the Gini coefficient of 
redistributed income. It compares Gini coefficients before and after redistribution. If the Gini 
coefficient or initial income distribution is larger than that of redistributive income 
distribution, the policy is said to improve the income inequalities and has a positive effect on 
income distribution. Otherwise, the policy makes income inequalities worse and has negative 
effect on income distribution.   
The other indicator is called redistributive coefficient, which is to measure the relevant 
variation of income inequalities. The expression of the indicator is as following equation. 
                                                  
8 Coronado et al. (2000) derived a measurement from this index to estimate the effective 




R = MT/G ×100 
Because our study focuses on the redistributive effects affecting workers and retirees in 
urban China, we selected urban residents above 16 years of age (samples of 4024 in 1995 and 
3378 in 2002 were excluded), and eliminated samples classified as “currently a full-time 
student,” “awaiting job assignment or school admission,” (1207 in 1995 and 1529 in 2002) 
and those whose income or current status information was missing (717 in 1995 and 34 in 
2002)
9. The sample size after the adjustment was 15,748 for 1995 and 15,691 for 2002. 
The measurements of initial income and redistributed income are as follows
10:  
 
Initial income = salaries + net income of private businesses + property income + private 
insurance benefits + monetary value of income in kind + other minor sources of income. 
 
Redistributed income = initial income − personal income tax + social security benefits 
(pension benefits, social relief that includes the minimum living standard guarantee, 
unemployment insurance, medical expenses paid by public sources) − social security 
payments 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of initial income and redistributed income. 
Compared with 1995, in 2002, both social security benefits and social security contribution 
increased, however, social security benefits increased only by 74.31% while the contribution 
                                                  
9  Considering the income information of the unemployed might be missing, in order to keep the 
unemployed in the sample, for these samples with current status being unemployed and no income 
information recorded, we would change the income to zero. 
10  It should be noted that the composition of the initial and redistributed incomes used here is different 
from the “gross income” used in Atkinson et al. (1995). Our initial income does not include 
transferred income from public policy and social security. And since private transfers such as 
alimony tend to respond to negative shocks experienced by the recipients (Cai, Giles, and Meng 
2006) and would confound the redistributive effects of public transfers. The CHIP data identify two 
main sources of private transfer income: required cash transfers by relatives (alimony income) and 
cash voluntarily transferred by relatives (donated income). Both sources of income are likely to 
respond to income shocks (such as pension arrearages, lay-offs, or unemployment); therefore, our 





increased by 645%.   
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
3.2 Social Security’s Effects on Different Income Groups 
First, we examine social security’s redistributive effects on reducing poverty. Adopting the 
approach of Cai, Giles, and Meng (2006), we calculated the proportion of families below the 
poverty line. The poverty line is based on the minimum living standard consumption per 
capita calculated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security for each province’s capital city. 
The average annual poverty line across the 12 capital cities of the CHIP provinces was 2454 
Yuan per capita in 2002. Household per capita initial income below 2454 Yuan accounted for 
17% of total households, but if measured by per capita redistributed income, the poverty 
households accounted for only 2%. Clearly, social security contributed enormously to 
reducing poverty.   
We use the relative poverty rate as a measurement without the data of minimum living 
standard consumption per capita line.
11 According to Förster and Mira D'Ercole (2005), the 
relative poverty rate is defined as:
12 
PR  =  Np/N×100   
where N refers to the number of whole population, and Np is the number of population that 
earns less than half the median income. 
In 1995, the median initial income was 4,876 Yuan. 18.2% households’ reported income 
was below half the median total household income, whereas the percentage of households 
receiving redistributed income under 2,438 Yuan decreased to 3.2%, showing a decline rate of 
                                                  
11  Since the minimum living allowance program was not in effect in 1995, the share of household 
benefited from the program can’t be used to measure poverty. 




82.4%. Similarly, we calculated that the relative poverty rate based on initial income was 
23.6% in 2002, yet the relative poverty rate based on redistributed income was only 6.6%, 
showing a decrease rate of 72%. However, the 2002 PR indexes for both initial and 
redistributed income increased relatively to the 1995 indexes, indicating that population of the 
lowest-income group had increased. 
Using initial income per capita and redistributed income per capita, we divide individual 
into quintile groups according to initial income and redistributed income respectively to 
examine income distribution of initial income and net benefit distribution of social security. 
Table 3 reports the mean age and sample sizes in each income group.   
(Insert Table 3 here) 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
Table 4 shows the distribution of initial and redistributed incomes as a percentage share 
of the total income in 1995 and 2002. The first two rows display each quintile’s percentage 
share (initial and redistributed incomes) in 1995. The middle two rows display each quintile’s 
percentage share (initial and redistributed incomes) in 2002. For both 1995 and 2002, note 
that the redistributed income of different quintiles has a more equal distribution because of 
benefits from social security. In particular, the lowest quintile’s share of total income 
increased by 9.48 percentage points in 1995 and 10.22 percentage points in 2002 (see Change 
1 in Table4). Further, compared with initial income, redistributed incomes of groups above the 
middle quintile accounted for a smaller share of the total income, and the higher the income, 
the larger is the proportionate decline. Therefore, social security has a greater effect on 
increasing the income of lower income groups measured by annual income. 
Note that the groups ranking below the middle quintile showed a decrease in percentage 
share between 1995 and 2002, whether measured by changes in initial income (Change 2-I) or 




and the highest fifth. As measured by initial income, the lowest quintile’s share of total 
income declined from 4.12% in 1995 to 2.8% in 2002, but the highest quintile’s share rose 
from 40.16% in 1995 to 45.21% in 2002. This is also the trend for redistributed income. The 
lowest-income quintile’s share declined in 2002 compared with that of 1995, but the trend for 
higher-income groups was the opposite. This demonstrates that inequality of income 
redistribution in urban China was growing, as the Gini coefficient in the rightmost column of 
Table 5 illustrates that the Gini coefficient in 2002 is larger than that in 1995 for both initial 
and redistributed incomes. 
Moreover, the redistributive coefficient R (the last two rows of Table 4), representing the 
relative change in the degree of inequality, was essentially identical in 1995 and 2002, but the 
Gini coefficient in 2002 increased over 1995. Social security’s income transfers reduced 
inequality by raising income among low-income groups, but not enough to offset the 
expanding inequality in initial income.   
Besides the possible change of the redistributive effect of the policy rules in social 
security system, this result can be explained in two aspects: first, income shocks (such as 
being laid-off, unemployment) faced by individuals in 2002 exacerbated the degree of income 
inequality. Since 1996, China's labor market reforms have led to a large number of laid-off 
workers. The number of laid-off workers had a rapid increase from 8,916,337 in 1996 to14, 
352,155 in 1997 and to 19,771,986 in 1998. From 1999 to 2001, more than 200 million 
people were laid off every year, and the number of laid-off workers accounted for about 19% 
of the total workers in post. The number of laid-off workers in 2002 was slightly down but 
still up to 19,594,870 people, accounting for 18.56% of the total urban workers in post
13. Also, 
Xia et al. (2007), using the CHIP database, found that the percentage of families with laid-off 
members had increased from 5.55% in 1995 to 20% in 2002. These laid-off workers were 
                                                  





supposed to get a severance payment for being laid-off, but only 18% of the laid-off workers’ 
families could get this payment in 2002. The average yearly income of these (laid-off or 
unemployed) people was only 29% of that of the working or employed ones; these income 
shocks have undoubtedly increased inequality of the initial income distribution. 
On the other hand, though the social security system in urban China, including pension 
insurance system, medical insurance system and other kinds of insurance, was thoroughly 
reformed in the late 1990s, Figure1 presents that the coverage of urban employees by social 
security was still low in 2002, including that the maximum coverage of pension insurance was 
less than 50%. Furthermore, since the government promised to take responsibility for social 
security and asked laid-off workers to determinate the labor contract with their original work 
units, the living subsidy provided by work units had reached an extreme low level in 2002. In 
fact, Xia et al. (2007) found that only 11% of laid-off workers’ families enjoyed the 
unemployment benefits while only 8% enjoyed the minimum living standard guarantee. 
Moreover, Cai, Giles and Meng (2006) found that pension arrears had emerged in some areas. 
Therefore, the income transfers of social security reduced the degree of income inequality, but 
this kind of improvement was limited.   
We also compute the Gini coefficients of initial income and redistributed income for 
working age group (male of 16-59 and female of 16-54) and elderly group（male of 60 and 
over and female of 55 and over）. The results show the Gini coefficients are larger in 2002 
than that in 1995 either in initial income or redistributed income. But the redistribution 
coefficient in elderly group is much higher than that of working age group, which is 55.9% 
and 11.83 respectively in 1995, 51.63% and 13.53% respectively in 2002. Therefore, the 
redistributive effect of social security in China is mainly demonstrated in elderly group and its 
effect on income of working age group is not significant. 





Figure 3 demonstrates the net benefit of social security for each income group and 
divides the sample into age groups within the income group. Except those younger than 40, 
the age pattern of net benefit is same in all income groups. In both periods of time, all income 
groups have positive net benefits. The net benefit is increasing with income increasing and in 
each income group, the elderly benefit most from the system. 
Generally speaking, social security has a positive transfer of income. Various researches 
based on OECD countries show that social security system in these countries has redistributed 
income from higher to lower income groups. However, in China, the redistributive effect is 
inter-generations rather than between income groups. Although the elderly have a positive 
transfer, the elderly in higher income group gain more. Overall, the net benefit of highest 
income group is 1.4 times and 3.2 times as much as lowest income groups in 1995 and in 
2002 respectively. The net benefit of the elderly in highest income group is 2.6 times and 4 
times as much as the elderly in lowest income groups in 1995 and 2002 respectively. This 
outcome implies that the adverse income transfer of social security was increasing over time.   
We obtain the same tendency using aggregate data form statistic yearbooks. Employing 
annual income of households, figure 4 shows that, the households benefit most from social 
security system are not the lower income households but the higher income households. 
During 2002 to 2008, in each year, the net benefit has been increasing with income of the 
households. The net benefit of highest income households is 7.4-9.3 times as much as that of 
lowest income households. From year 2002 to 2008, the net benefit of lowest income 
households was increasing by a small margin, much smaller than that of highest income 
households. 
The above outcomes are based on annual income. For particular social security program, 
such as public pension, to estimate of redistributive effect requires an evaluation based on life 
cycle income as we discussed in introduction. 





4.  Redistributive effects of different pension design based on lifetime income 
As noted earlier, the cost and benefit of the pension system changed at different stages of 
the lifecycle. Therefore, it takes a lifelong process to uncover its overall effect. It is thus 
necessary to investigate it from a lifelong perspective. From a theoretical stance, the 
redistribution through the pension system can be understood as follows. The individual earns 
the right to receive a pension during his retirement by participating in the public pension 
system, thus accumulating pension assets. However, under a PAYG system, the level of 
pension one receives and the contributions one pays are determined by population growth 
rates and wages growth rate at each time period. As such, the actuarial present value of costs 
and the actuarial present value of benefits could be different. This margin is called the net 
benefit, which reflects the lifetime cost versus benefit, and therefore is the total redistribution 
transfer through the public pension system. The redistribution exists if the net benefit is not 
zero, and vice versa. 
As described in section 2, current public pension system is a partial funded system 
combined social pooling with individual account. The practical policy rule of benefit for each 
group is different. In addition, pre-reform pension system before 1997 was applied to urban 
employees of the Chinese public sector so far, which issued that pension benefits would be 
calculated at a certain rate of an individual’s wages upon reaching his retirement age. If 
provisions in the 2005 reform were applied to urban employees in the Chinese public sector, 
how would the pension system contribute to the equalizing effect? If the PAYG part of the 
system were replaced by a fully funded system, would the result reduce current inequalities? 
In this section, we estimate the redistributive effects of various pension plans on the basis of 
lifetime income.   
From life cycle perspective, we need information of lifetime contributions and benefits. If 




cycle, from which it is convenient to calculate the present value of lifetime contributions and 
benefits and get the net benefits. However, the partial funded system has been in effect in 
China only for about one decade, there is no such data. Even in countries with this data 
available, such as US, Italy and Japan, sometimes it is impossible for the researcher to have 
access to the data. So in literature, the lifetime net benefits are to be estimated according to 
cross sectional data and based on certain assumptions. 
We use CHIP data, first to calculate the abovementioned lifetime net benefits according to 
the policy rules of Chinese pension program and then we derive lifetime income distribution 
index (the Gini coefficient) under various pension program designs. Finally, we analyze the 
pension system’s effect on inequality. The following discussion uses only the data for lifetime 
wage income and ignores income from all other sources. In short, our concept of lifetime 
income defines initial income as income from labor and defines redistributed income as initial 
income plus lifetime net benefits from pension payments. 
The procedure of the computation is as follows. First, we use samples of 20-59 male and 
20-54 female who have wage earnings in CHIP data of 1995 and 2002 and estimating a wage 
equation with individual characteristics such as age, education, occupation and regional 
dummies as explanatory variables.
14 Then, with the aid of the wage equation we predict 
annual income, hence, the individual’s lifetime income distribution assuming a wage growth 
rate and interest rate hypotheses. The last step is to derive contributions and net pension 
benefits for each arrangement of pension program according to the policy rules. (See Feng et 
al 2011 appendix for details) 
We consider three possible designs of pension program. Design1 represents the current 
pension plan, i.e., pre-reform pension provision is applied to the public sector employees, 
which would be calculated by a certain proportion of the wage income when retired
15, yet 
                                                  
14  The regression results refer to table 1 in He (2008).   
15  Replacement ratio of pension for employees in public sector is determined by working experience, 




other employees’ would be calculated according to the policy rules of 2005 plan in the 
appendix table 1. Those who entered labor market after 1997 are “New participants” and their 
pension benefits consist of basic benefit and benefit from individual account. Those started to 
work before 1997 and retired after 1997 are “In-between participants” and their pension 
consist of basic benefit, transitional benefit and benefit from the individual account
16. 
Design2 assumes that the 2005 reform is applicable to the whole samples, i.e., the benefit and 
contribution of employee in both public sectors and other sectors are calculated using the 
same formula. 
Design 3 represents the fully funded system and it is applicable to the whole samples, i.e., 
pension benefits consist of only individual account pensions if the employee is a “New 
participants” and pension benefits consist of individual account pensions and transitional 
benefit if the employee is a “In-between participants” 
We use three indicators to estimate the redistributive effects. The first is the ratio of 
redistributed income between public sector employees and employees of other sectors (A). 
The second is the ratio of redistributed income between the highest- and lowest-income 
groups (B), with groups divided into deciles on the basis of initial income levels. The third is 
a redistributive coefficient R. Table 5 shows the redistributive effect under three designs. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
The results illustrate that Design 2 has the largest effect on redistributing income and 
narrowing the income gap. Under Design 2, the ratio of redistributive income between public 
sector employees and employees of other sectors is 1.2992, the ratios are smaller than those 
from Design 1 and Design 3, indicating that the distributed income gap among public sectors 
                                                  
16  In addition, those who retired before 1997 are old participants. In reality, due to various entering 
age in labor market and retirement age, there is no fixed formula to relate age with old, in-between 
and new participants. For reference, if entering labor market in 20 and retiring in 60, then those of 
65 and over in 2002 are called old participants, those of 26 to 64 are in-between participants and 
those below 25 are new participants. This study uses samples of age 20-59 in 2002, so most sample 




and others is smallest under Design 2, and distributed income gap between the highest- and 
lowest-income groups is also smallest. The redistributive coefficient R again demonstrates 
that Design 2 has the strongest effect on narrowing the income gap.   
We divide the sample into deciles ranking from low to high on the basis of initial income. 
Figure 5 shows the net benefit of each income group under various designs. There is an 
obvious trend that net benefit is increasing with income, no matter under what design. The 
results imply that the adverse redistributive effect of Chinese social security exists when 
evaluating based on lifetime income, especially under current policy rule, i.e., design 1.     
(Insert Figure 5 here) 
 
To compare the annual and lifetime income-based effects, we utilize annual income from 
the same sample to calculate the Gini coefficient for both initial and redistributed incomes 
0.3417 and 0.3406, respectively. These results are lower than the lowest redistributive 
coefficient reported in Table 6. This implies the redistributive effect of the pension system 
could be negligible if measured by annual income in current workers. However, the effect 
strengthens if measured by long-term income. This implies the long-term redistributive effect 
is larger as compared with its short term effect in current workers. 
 
5.  Findings and Policy Implications 
We use the CHIP data to estimate the income redistributive effects of the Chinese urban 
social security system from several new perspectives. Our findings are as follows:   
1. Public pension is the main income for the elderly in urban China. During both pre-reform 
and post reform period of time, Majority of people aged 60 and over (72% in 1995, 82% in 
2002) have pension, comprising 80% to more than 90% of their total income. Moreover, 




sources are salary and private transfers. In contrast, the percentage of employees covered 
by public health insurance programs declined from 76% in 1995 to 63% in 2002. Among 
the retirees, the coverage declined from 81% to 72%.） 
2. In urban China, social security greatly improved the income of low-income groups and 
helped to reduce poverty. The proportion of households that earned less than half the 
median income was reduced after social security transfer payments; Comparing 2002 with 
1995, however, inequality of initial income of urban residents expanded and the relative 
poverty rate increased, indicating that the number of low-income groups had increased.
17 
Meanwhile, although the Gini coefficient and relative poverty rate declined in 2002 after 
redistribution by social security, they remained higher than those in 1995. Since the 
increase of initial income inequality could also affect the Gini coefficient based on 
redistributed income, without controlling changes of initial income between 1995 and 2002, 
it is difficult to draw a conclusion that the Gini coefficient of redistribution income in 2002 
was actually higher than that in 1995 due to the weakened redistributive effect of social 
security. However, we can conclude that the effectiveness of social security in reducing 
inequality did not offset the increasing initial income inequality from 1995 to 2002, 
although income inequality decreased through income transfers provided by social security 
and hence the Gini coefficient of redistribution income in 2002 was higher than in 1995） 
3. The redistributive effect of Chinese social security system demonstrates an 
inter-generational transfer rather than the transfer from high to low income. During 1995 
and 2002, both low income group and high income group get positive benefit from social 
security system, but the net benefit is increasing with income. Overall, the net benefit of 
highest income group is 1.4 times and 3.2 times as much as lowest income groups in 1995 
and in 2002 respectively. The net benefit of the elderly in highest income group is 2.6 times 
and 4 times as much as the elderly in lowest income groups in 1995 and 2002 respectively. 
                                                  




This outcome implies that the adverse income transfer of social security was increasing 
over time. Using aggregate data and estimating with lifetime income show the same 
tendency. 
4. We use lifetime income to evaluate the redistributive effect of pension program among 
current workers and we find that a combination of funded system and a PAYG system has 
larger effect in improving income inequality. Furthermore, if the current policy is extended 
to all employees including those in public sectors, the income gap between employees in 
public sectors and other sectors is going to be declined more, so is the gap between income 
in highest and lowest income group. In addition, we find that its effect is significantly 
larger than the short-term effect calculated using one year’s income, when measured by 
lifetime income. China is now discussing how to reform public sector pensions. If the 
government expects social security to play a bigger role in income redistribution, 
differences in long-term and short-term effects of pensions should be considered.   
 
In summary, from 1995 to 2002, the social security system in urban China raised the 
income of low-income and old-age groups and narrowed the income gap. The redistributive 
effect of the social security system did not offset the expanding income inequality. The 2002 
Gini coefficient of redistributed income was higher than that in 1995, and public medical 
insurance protection was weakened, the adverse income transfer of social security was 
increasing over time. If the government wishes to improve income distribution, it can 
strengthen the equalizing effect of social security by improving the public medical insurance 
system, cutting the benefit from social security of high income groups for changing the 
adverse income transfer, adjusting the proportion of basic pension and individual account 
pension in the pension system, and instituting a unified pension system for the entire urban 
labor market. In addition to these changes in the social security system, inequality in income 
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Figure 1    The coverage of social security system in China (Number of participants / 




Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbook, 2003, China Statistical Yearbook, 2008, China 















Note: Recipients are calculated as follows.   
Pension-R1= number of people aged 60 and over, with pension benefits /number of people 
aged 60 and over 100 
Pension-R2= number of retirees aged 60 and over, with pension benefits /number of retirees 
aged 60 and over  100 
Pension-R3= number of retirees who did not receive pension benefits  adequately in 
time/number of retirees  100 
Health-R1= number of employees covered by public medical and health programs/number of 
employees  100 
Health-R2= number of retirees covered by public medical and health programs/number of 
retirees  100 
Health-R3= number of retirees who could not write off the medical expenses adequately in 
time/number of retirees  100 
Source: CHIP data in 1995 and 2002. Unless otherwise stated, the diagrams from here on are 





























































Note: NB = benefit of social security – contribution of social insurance (RMB yuan, 2002 
price). labor1:16-39 working age samples. labor2:40 and over working age samples. elderly: 


























Note: urban households are divided and sorted by disposable income per capita, according to 
household share of 10%，10%，20%，20%，20%，10%，10%, the households are labeled as 
lowest income households, low income households, middle to low income groups, middle 
income groups, middle to high income groups, high income groups and highest income 
groups, altogether 7 income groups.   
Sources: Survey on China’s Price and the Income and Expenditure of Urban Residents, 
2002-2003, Yearbook of China’s Cities, 2004, 2005 and China Urban Life and Price 




















Note: NB = Present Value of personal lifetiome net benefits from pension system 




Table 1    Annual income and pension benefits, 1995 and 2002 
 
Data Type
Year 1995 2002 1995 2002
Average Annual Wage of  Staff and
Workers(Yuan)
5500 12,422 5616 12,123
Per Capita Annual Disposable
Income of Urban Households(Yuan)
4288.1 8177.4 4745 8230
Per Capita Annual Pension Benefits
of Retirees(Yuan)
4335 8807 4435 8743
Pension Replacement Rate(%) 78.8 70.9 78.9 72.1
National Statistics Data Survey Data
Table1 Annual Income and Pension Benefits
 
Note: Pension Replacement Rate = Per Capita Annual Pension Benefits of Retirees/Average 
Annual Wage of Staff and Workers  100. Average annual wage of staff and workers refer to 
wages of fully employed staff and workers, which do not include those of township and 
village and private enterprises.   
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2008), CHIP data (Summary statistics are calculated 





Table 2 Summary Statistics of the Total and the Components of Initial-Redistributed 
Income 
1995 2002 1995 2002
Salary 5127.810 7575.550
Net Income of Private
Businesses
72.465 314.219




Others Income 126.042 234.476
personal income tax 4.633 33.120
social security benefits 1263.838 2203.015




5523.452 8198.525 6613.222 9938.591
Initial Income Redistributed Income
 
Note:    Per capita annual income (Yuan) at 2002 price is used.  NA indicates that the kind of 
classification did not exist in 1995. 





Table3 The sample size and mean age of quintile groups 
1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002
Lowest
Fifth
51.94 54.38 3150 3140 42.51 44.73 3153 3139
Second
Fifth
41.01 45.04 3150 3139 42.47 45.60 3147 3138
Middle
Fifth
39.80 43.00 3150 3137 42.51 45.71 3151 3139
Fourth
Fifth
40.09 42.62 3149 3137 43.31 45.22 3149 3138
Highest
Fifth
40.97 42.25 3149 3138 43.02 46.05 3148 3137
Total 42.76 45.46 15748 15691 42.76 45.46 15748 15691
Income
Group
initial Income Quintile Redistributed Income Quintile


















initial income_1995(A) 4.12 12.82 18.38 24.52 40.16 0.3576
redistributed
income_1995(B)
13.61 13.38 16.97 21.60 34.46 0.2635
initial income_2002(C) 2.80 10.43 16.80 24.76 45.21 0.4240
redistributed
income_2002(D)
13.02 12.41 15.85 21.74 36.98 0.3165
Change1_1995 9.48 0.56 -1.41 -2.93 -5.71 -0.0941
Change1_2002 10.22 1.98 -0.95 -3.02 -8.23 -0.1074
Change2_Initial -1.32 -2.39 -1.58 0.24 5.05 0.0664












Note: Change1_1995 = B – A; Change1_2002 = D – C.  Change2_Initial=C–A;  Change2_Redistributed 





















Note: The sample consists of workers with labor income between 20-59 
（20-54 for female）of age in 2002.     
Redistributed Income = Initial Income  +  Net  pension  benefits        
Initial Income = Present Value of personal lifetime labor income in 2002.    
Net pension benefits = Present Value of personal lifetime net benefits from pension 
system  in  2002.      
R = (the Gini index for initial income- the Gini index for redistributed income)/the Gini 








Appendix  Table  1   






















personnel retired after 1997’s reform 
but started working before 1997’s reform 





28% of wage（  contributed jointly by employee and employer） ， 
11% of which is reserved in individual account 






28% of wage（contributed jointly by employee and employer） ， 
8% of which is reserved in individual account 




Same as the 
pre-reform terms，
which is x% of the 
individual standard 
retirement wage 
Basic pension  (20% of last year’s average monthly wage of local 
employees) + Individual account pension  (the amount of individual 
account savings/120)+Transitional pension（average indexed monthly 
earnings× modulus× years without an individual account 
Basic pension(20% of last year’s average monthly 
wage of local employees) + Individual account 






Same as the 
pre-reform terms，
which is x% of the 
individual standard 
retirement wage 
Basic pension (Years of contribution*1%*0.5(average indexed monthly 
earnings + last year’s average monthly wage of local employees))+ 
Individual account pension (the amount of individual account savings / 
months of payment scheduled(depends on average life expectancy of urban 
population at the time of retirement & age of retirement))+Transitional 
pension（average indexed monthly earnings × modulus× years without an 
individual account 
Basic pension (Years of contribution*1%*0.5 
(average indexed monthly earnings + last year’s 
average monthly wage of local employees))+ 
Individual account  pension  (the amount of 
individual account savings / months of payment 
scheduled(depends on average life expectancy of 
urban population at the time of retirement & age of 
retirement )) 
 